

Pragmatics II Notes

[These notes are *very* rough. The handout gives a much clearer picture of the course of the argument. I pass on these notes because they include reminders of some topics I talked about that are not on that handout outline, and some topics in the vicinity that I did not manage to fit in.]

Introduction:

There are five important bits of conceptual machinery that I put on the table last week that I want to build on this time:

- a) The idea of a *pragmatic* metavocabulary. This is a metalanguage for talking about what one is *doing* in *using* linguistic expressions. It contrasts for instance with *semantic* metavocabularies (typically using terms such as ‘true’ and ‘refers’) that talk about the *meanings* of linguistic expressions.
- b) The idea of a *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary.
- c) The idea of using a normative pragmatic MV that is deontically *two-dimensional*, so not using merely *binary* deontic statuses: appropriate/inappropriate, correct/incorrect, assertible/nonassertible. I suggested commitment/entitlement.
- d) In terms of commitment/entitlement (and the closely related responsibility/authority), I described the intimate relations between speech acts of *asserting* and those of *defending* and *challenging*, offering and demanding *reasons*. Without these, we cannot make sense of the disjunction between commitment and entitlement that is required to understand the central *testimonial* authority of assertions.
Here I sang the praises of the *default-and-challenge* structure of commitment and entitlement, for its *epistemological* consequences.
- e) The Harman point, distinguishing practices of inferring as a *doing*, reasoning *practices*, from *relations* implication. The latter I want to call “reason relations.”

We can think about this distinction as one between inferential *moves* between *claimings*, a kind of *position*, specifiable in a *pragmatic* MV that lets us talk about what we are *doing* in talking, which includes claiming, and inferring, and implications relations among *claimable* contents.

I want to deepen these points, by looking at the relations among them.

In particular, I want to think harder about the Harman point, in the light of the deontic two-dimensionalism of the sketch of assertional and reason-giving practices I offered.

Here the central issue is how to understand the *relations* between the two things Harman obliges us to distinguish:

- i. Practices of asserting (premises and conclusions) and inferring (*defending* and *challenging* assertings, by producing more assertings), the positions and moves of practices of reasoning, and
- ii. Reason relations, paradigmatically implication or consequence relations between assertibles = claimables, as I will say, the *contents* expressed by the *sentences* asserted.

The first articulates *practices of giving and asking for reasons* (cf. “GoGAR”), and the second the “space of reasons,” that consists of the (propositional) *contents* expressed by using sentences assertively, when those contents are thought of as standing in relations of *implication* or *consequence* to one another—and, I will argue, necessarily also relations of *incompatibility* to one another. These are relations of claimables being reasons *for* other claimables, and being reasons *against* other claimables.

I will do this in two steps:

- A) Considering Restall’s and Ripley’s normative bilateralist pragmatic explanation of the fundamental reason relation of implication.
- B) Show how we can add a further level of fine-structure to that account by rendering it in a deontically *two-dimensional* pragmatic MV of commitment and entitlement.

Here the concept is that of incompatibility.

Incompatibility is at once:

- i) Definable two-dimensionally, in terms of commitment and (preclusion of) entitlement,
- ii) Another reason relation, in addition to implication,
- iii) Incompatibility : reasons against : challenges :: implication : reasons for : defenses
- iv) Contributes the idea of commitments *precluding* entitlements, which is what I then (inspired by Simonelli) transmute into more articulated deontically two-dimensional pragmatic bilateralist renderings of both kinds of reason relation.

Prospectus:

- a) Reminder of Harman point: practices of reasoning distinguished from reason *relations*.
- b) Part 1: from reasoning to reason *relations*: explaining the first arrow in the Mandala. Making sense of reason relations—saying what implication and incompatibility *are*—in terms of reasoning practices. This is to be done in two parts: considering extant bilateralist explanations of implication, and then developing its motivating ideas into a deontically two-dimensional idiom of commitment and entitlement.
- c) Part 2: (The other way around:) Understand the role of reason relations in normatively governing reasoning practices. This is confirming the adequacy of the account in Part I.

- d) I will pick up on the theme of *deontic two-dimensionalism* from last week, by focusing on incompatibility, which is perhaps the first fruit of that strategy, when applied to *commitment* and *entitlement*.

It is important, and needs to be argued, that *incompatibility* is a reason relation entirely on a par with *implication*.

What I am doing is:

- a) Looking at the fine structure of the basic binary opposition between, on the one hand, *attitudes* of acceptance/rejection, and, on the other, between the *relations* of being a reason for/against—which, in a *further* move, I identify with the relations of implication=consequence and incompatibility=incoherence.
- b) **Turning this (complex) binary opposition into a genuinely two-dimensional deontic structure**, by appeal to commitment, and entitlement, and through them, incompatibility.

A key point is that one can *either*;

- a) Forego deontic two-dimensionalism by appeal to logical negation, and read entitled=df. Not-committed-not, or committed as not-entitled-not, *or*
- b) Embrace deontic two-dimensionalism of commitment and entitlement, define a *substantive* (content-explicative, semantogenic) notion of incompatibility, and *then* introduce *and explain* the logical notion of negation.

Note that I will re-apply the strategy in (a), in the sense of acknowledging what is right about it, by connecting (while still distinguishing—the finer level of structure here) *explicit* prohibition of entitlement (to reject/accept) from *implicit* commitment (to accept/reject).

Part 1 A: Bilateralist Normative Pragmatic Account of Reason Relation of Implication

Start with the Harman point, about the distinction between

- i. Reasoning practices: inferring, relating claimings (acts) or believings (attitudes)
- ii. Reason relations: implication, relating claimables or believable (contents).

Seeing that we can distinguish these, we can ask about their *relations*.

We are aiming at a pragmatics-first account of reason relations, and then an account of semantics in terms of reason relations. This contrasts with giving a semantics-first account of reason relations (as Fine does), and leaving it to a subsequent pragmatics to connect this to reasoning practices.

Deontic two-dimensionality is a view about the pragmatic metavocabularies in which we specify reasoning practices, which our account of asserting showed to be an essential aspect of assertional practices.

Asserting we understood in deontically two-dimensional terms of commitment/entitlement.

We will see that there is a reflection of this deontic two-dimensionality concerning reasoning *practices* in the two-dimensionality of reason *relations*. That is the story I tell in Part 1.

RR-bilateralism suggests a way to connect a normative pragmatics (though not yet an explicit deontic two-dimensionality) with an understanding of reason relations—at least of the reason relation of *implication*.

It does so by **distinguishing speech acts of *assertion/denial***.

I will suggest keeping in play also attitudes of acceptance/rejection, which are *expressed by* those speech acts.

So if we start with the Harman point, we can **ask about the relations between practices and reason relations**.

Might give a pragmatics-first account of those relations.

RR-bilateralism shows how this might be done.

The basic idea of bilateralism can be put in two parts:

1. **There is a fundamental bipolarity or *bivalence* of speech acts: there is not only *assertion*, but *denial*.**

If, as I would recommend, we think also about practical attitudes, as well as the speech acts that manifest them, this is the opposition between *acceptance* and *rejection*. What is accepted/rejected is some assertible/deniable *content*: what I will call a “claimable.”

Can approach this bipolarity semantically, as true/false.

Accepting is taking-true, rejecting is taking-false.

Can have pragmatics-first or semantics-first orders of explanation here.

Bilateralism offers a strategy for a pragmatics-first order of explanation.

Contrast the traditional, semantics-first order of explanation with the pragmatics-first order of explanation I will recommend:

A semantics-first account of implication would be in terms of true/false.

Simplest version of *that* is truth-preservation: $\Gamma \models A$ says that if all of Γ is true then A is true.

Fine will offer a genuinely two-dimensional *semantics*-first account of reason relations, that defines consequence in terms of *both* truth and falsity (*truthmakers* and *falsemakers*).

One of those is pursuing a pragmatics-first order of explanation, as opposed to a semantics-first order of explanation.

Two issues with semantic-first order of explanation of reason relations:

- a) One big issue with a semantics-first order of explanation of implication is that if (as in model theory and possible worlds—but not with truthmaker semantics [because commutative monoids let you avoid it], though Fine doesn’t exploit this—one models *implication* by set-theoretic *inclusion* relations. This goes deep in Tarski (even though it is topology, not Boolean algebras of sets—cf. Stone Representation Theorem). That builds in both monotonicity and transitivity, not just for *logical* reason relations, but for *all* the relations of implication and incompatibility it can represent.
- b) On the side of *incompatibility-incoherence*, using the set-theoretic *complement* relation to model this builds in exclusions of *gaps* and *gluts*.

This is clearly bad for *nonlogical* incompatibility-incoherence.

We have been using three-valued logics instead, on this dimension of reason relations.

LP allows and controls gluts.

K3 allows and controls gaps.

We will see that there are important insights there, but that this mathematical apparatus should be brought to bear at a different, later, phase of the explanation.

- c) All of this could be avoided if, instead of set-theoretic/Boolean operations, we used a commutative monoid for our semantics.

That is common to truthmaker semantics, and to implication-space semantics.

2. That bivalence is the key to understanding the reason *relation* of implication.

This is the really deep idea.

More specifically, that bipolarity corresponds to the two *sides* of the implication relation.

The premise side of an implication relation is associated with *assertion*, and

The conclusion side of an implication is associated with *denial*.

Obviously, a lot turns on what we mean by “associated with.”

But it is not at all obvious why those speech acts or practical attitudes should *line up* (in some sense to be determined) with the two sides of the implication turnstile.

(We’ll see that there is a sense in which this is lining the *premises* up with *truth* and the lining the *conclusions* up with *falsehood*. This will teach us something important about Fine’s truthmaker semantics—though not a lesson he himself draws.)

This key connection, the deep idea behind Restall-Ripley bilateralism, is not at all an obvious one.

It is the idea I want to unpack, pursue, and develop.

- a) **Restall-Ripley account is “bilateral” in that it treats the two sides (“latera”) of the turnstile as having different pragmatic significances.** The premise-side is about *assertion* (acceptance) and the conclusion-side is about *denial* (rejection). It then tells us that $\Gamma|\sim A$ says that *asserting* (accepting) all of Γ and *denying* A is normatively *out-of-bounds* (=bad).

In keeping with Harman’s point, that only constrains what you should do (“Get back in bounds.”), without determining specifically what one should do.

Last time, I told a story about the intimate connection between assertion and reasons.

RR-bilateralism is a pragmatics-first explanation of one reason *relation*, implication, in terms of speech acts of assertion. Its master idea is that one can offer such a pragmatics-first explanation of that reason relation *if*

- i. one treats assertion (acceptance) bivalently: as one of a *pair* of speech acts (attitudes), along with denial (rejection), and
- ii. treats the implication turnstile relating assertibles/deniabiles (accepables/rejectables) contents *bilaterally*, i.e. with assertion on the LHS and denial on the RHS, and
- iii. uses a *global* or *holistic* normative status of out-of-boundness, impropriety, or exclusion-of-entitlement (you are not permitted to be in this position) that governs the *whole* position indicated by the bilaterally considered, two-sided implication relation.

These are the key points of RR-bilateralism, in virtue of which it can understand the key reason relation of implication in terms of a deontic pragmatic MV.

I will take over *all* these ideas.

But I will combine them with a deontically two-dimensional account of commitments/entitlements, in terms of which last time I sketched a story about how assertion is related to reasons.

On the basis of that story, we can move from the binary distinctions of attitudes accept/reject and speech acts expressing those practical doxastic attitudes assert/deny to the reason-involving pragmatic significances of speech acts defend/challenge, as offer-reasons-for/offer-reasons-against.

- If accepting A functions practically as a reason *to accept* B, then A provides a reason *for* B, and
- If accepting A functions practically as a reason *to reject* B then A provides a reason *against* B.

As the next step, we can then think of *implication* relations as codifying reasons *for* and *incompatibility* relations as codifying reasons *against*.

The idea is to start with practices of reasoning, in the sense of practices of giving reasons that entitle one to acts or attitudes of accepting and rejecting claims.

We can think of a dialogical situation, where those who accept or reject a claim can be challenged to defend that attitude, to *justify* it by offering *reasons* to accept or reject it.

These practices of asking for and offering reasons *to* do something, to accept or reject a claim (claimable), must respect reason relations among claimables according to which some of them provide reasons *for* and reasons *against* others.

These we understand as relations of material implication and incompatibility.

What stand in *these* relations are not acts or attitudes, but **claimable contents**: what one can accept or reject (whether reasonably or not, depending on what reasons *to* adopt those attitudes one can offer).

That is where we are going.

But first, let me offer an aside about bilateralism, both for general interest, and because at least one of the two points I want to make will come back and be important when we look at actual logics.

(Notice that although Greg Restall and Dave Ripley are logicians, nothing specifically *logical* is invoked by or involved in their normative bilateralist understanding of implication.)

The two points are:

- a) **Reading multisuccedent sequents**: Sequent calculi of Gentzen.

Start by describing the idea of *sequent calculi*, in the most general terms.

At this level of abstraction, the idea is to treat *sequents* as objects.

In the notation I'll use, this is things of the form $\Gamma|\sim A$ or $\Gamma|\sim\Delta$.

Might say something about how incompatibility-incoherence is expressed, by empty RHS. This is dual to expression of theoremhood, by empty LHS.

Gentzen's astonishing result: Can use *same rules* to introduce connectives, and get either classical or intuitionistic logic, depending only on whether one allows multiple conclusions or insists on single conclusions of implications.

This gives us a problem in understanding multiple succedent sequents, since the comma expresses conjunction on the left, and disjunction on the right.

Restall responds with his bilateralist reading.

It is a normative pragmatic account of the meaning of the sequent turnstile.

It is, in effect, a bilateralist normative pragmatic metavocabulary for sequents.

- b) **Smiley-Rumfitt bilateralism** (Ian Rumfitt's book is *The Boundary Stones of Thought*) attaches valences to assertibles/deniabiles, rather than to the two *sides* of the implication turnstile.

They

- i) think multisuccedent implication relations bear no relation to actual practice and
- ii) like classical logic.

Attaching valences to claimables, rather than sides of the turnstile, lets them get single succedent versions of classical logic.

[This would be a good point to acknowledge how much the story I'm going to be telling here owes to **Ryan Simonelli**.

He himself (in his dissertation), favors an SR bilateralism rather than an RR one, as I will.

But again and again over the last two years he has contributed ideas that shape my story in ways too fundamental to easily disentangle.

Hlobil's and Kaplan's contributions are marked by their authorship of the book.

Simonelli's are not marked that way, but run nearly as deep.]

Part 1 B: Incompatibility and Deontically Two-Dimensional Pragmatic Accounts of Reason Relations of Implication and Incompatibility.

Overall plan:

- a) Pragmatics: about reasons for/against, defense/ challenge, assert/deny, accept/reject, true/false approached only from this pragmatics-first direction.
From a semantics-first direction, we start with true/false and understand attitudes of accept/reject as taking-true/taking-false, and go from there.
- b) Two-dimensional deontics: commitment/entitlement (responsibility/authority)
- c) Mediating between them: reason relations of implication/incompatibility.
- d) Showing how they all fit together: the bilateralist definitions of $|\sim$ and $\#$ in terms of commitment/entitlement.
 - i. From last time: deontic binarism vs. two-dimensionalism.
 - ii. **Incompatibility** as case in point. Incompatibility is both a demonstration and paradigm of what two- dimensionality gets you.

- Using commitment and entitlement to define incompatibility.

A and B are *incompatible* =_{df.} Commitment to A precludes entitlement to B, and *vice versa*.

[Remark on the issue of symmetry.]

That is a *semantic relation* among claimables, definable from deontic statuses of commitment and (preclusion of) entitlement

- Incompatibility in keeping score on assertions and reason:

First add commitments, then subtract entitlements accordingly as one attributes incompatible collateral commitments.

- How that makes entitlement *holistic*, where commitment is *atomistic*. For adding commitments can lose, defeat, or undercut entitlements.

Committive inferences (commitment-preserving implications) hold without conditions (well, save nonmonotonicity, but we ignore that for now). But entitlement-preserving implications are only *prima facie*. For one must then check whether they are precluded by an collateral incompatible commitments.

Discuss 4 sorts of reason relation, 3 inference-implication relations and one incompatibility relation from two normative varieties:

- i. **Commitment preserving**, corresponding for material implications to deductive implications,

- ii. **Entitlement preserving**, corresponding for material implications to inductive implications, (only *prima facie*, since entitlement can always be lost by having incompatible collateral commitments).
- iii. **Incompatibility**
 This is the relation I want to put in equal relation with implication, as a fundamental, irreducible reason relation.
 Its definability is a crucial advantage of deontic two-dimensionalism.
 My prior incompatibility semantics tries to do everything with this notion (as Hegel officially does), instead of (as I will here) treating the two reason relations as coeval, coequal, and
- iv. and **Incompatibility entailments**.
 “Pedro is a donkey” entails “Pedro is a mammal” in the sense that everything incompatible with “Pedro is a mammal” is incompatible with “Pedro is a donkey.”

Could mention **Sheffer connectives** in connection with incompatibility.

(Generalized Sheffer connectives, for modal logic and my quantificational variant, lose the connection to incompatibility.)

I began by distinguishing a *semantic* order of explanation, whose key conception is a distinction between two truth-values, true and false, with a *pragmatic* order of explanation, whose key conception is a distinction between two acts or practical attitudes, acceptance and rejection. In both cases there is a need to postulate something beyond declarative sentences, something that is in some sense *expressed by* such sentences, that is what is in the first instance true or false, accepted or rejected: the bearers of the truth-values, the objects of the doxastic attitudes.

A traditional semantic approach is to understand propositional contents as intensions: functions from a set of arguments to truth-values. I have been sketching an alternate approach, within the pragmatic order of explanation. It looks instead to *reasons* interlocutors can have to adopt the basic attitudes of doxastic acceptance and rejection.

In the context of the pragmatic order of explanation being considered, the only grip we have on reason relations is the role they play in practices of defending and challenging claims, by giving reasons to accept or reject them.

Here there are two main points that I would like to argue for.

- a) The first is that to be intelligible as practices of reasoning, in the sense of accepting and rejecting claimables and defending and challenging those stances with reasons for and against them, the participants in such practices must be understood as keeping track of two different normative statuses:
 - the kind of *commitment* one undertakes or acknowledges in accepting or rejecting a claimable by asserting or denying a sentence expressing it, and
 - the sort of *entitlement* to that status or practical attitude that is at issue when *reasons* are offered for or against it.

- b) The second is that there is an important dimension along which these two flavors of normative status have quite different structures.
- The basis on which *commitments* are attributed is **atomistic**,
 - while the basis on which *entitlements* are assessed is **holistic**.

Re (a): As to the first point, we can begin with the observation that accepting or rejecting a claimable, paradigmatically by asserting or denying it, is taking a stand on it, adopting a stance towards it.

It is committing oneself with respect to it, in the way one would by saying “Yea” or “Nay” to it in response to a suitable yes/no question.

On the side of uptake, what some other practitioner needs to be able practically to discriminate in order to count as understanding the speech act is *that* the speaker has committed herself (performed a committive act, expressed a doxastic attitude), *how* she has committed herself (which kind of attitude she has adopted and expressed: acceptance or rejection, a positive or a negative commitment), and *to what* she has committed herself (toward which claimable she has adopted a doxastic attitude by asserting or denying the declarative sentence she uttered).

What difference does it make whether an interlocutor can offer *reasons* to accept what he has accepted or to reject what he has rejected?

The doxastic *commitments* involved, the stances taken up, the attitudes adopted, are the same either way.

But it is also an integral feature of doxastic commitments that one’s *entitlement* to those (perhaps loosely undertaken) commitments is always potentially at issue.

For in taking up a doxastic stance one renders oneself liable to demands for justification, for exhibition of reasons to accept or reject the claim one has accepted or rejected.

One’s *liberty* to commit oneself, to adopt that attitude and acquire that status, is not *license* to do so.

Reasons matter because other practitioners must distinguish between the acceptances and rejections the speaker in question is *entitled* to, in virtue of having *reasons* to adopt those attitudes, and those the speaker is *not* entitled to, because unable to defend those commitments by offering reasons when suitably challenged to do so.

It follows that for each interlocutor there must be not only a difference between the attitudes (commitments) he has adopted and those he has not, but also, within those he has adopted, between those he is entitled to or justified in, has rational credentials for, and those that are *mere* commitments, bare of such accompanying entitlements.

In *Making It Explicit* I argue that what turns practically on one’s entitlement or justification is the testimonial authority of one’s act: its capacity to license others to adopt a corresponding attitude.

The essential point is that in addition to the *committive* dimension of assertional practice, there is the *critical* dimension: the aspect of the practice in which the rational propriety of those commitments, their justificatory status, is assessed.

Apart from this critical dimension, the notion of *reasons* gets no grip.

It gets its grip from those keeping deontic score on their fellow discursive practitioners, who treat a failure to satisfy the justificatory responsibility implicit in undertaking a doxastic commitment as undercutting the interpersonal authority such a commitment otherwise could exercise.

Re (b): The second structural observation is that **entitlements are fragile** in a way that commitments are not. They are vulnerable to being undercut by incompatible collateral commitments.

The basic phenomenon here is twofold.

First, it is not impossible for someone to be committed both to accept and to reject the same claimable.

But second, one cannot then count as *entitled* to those contrary commitments.

For each commitment provides a decisive reason against the other.

The contrary commitments might have arisen through affirmation and denial of the same sentence—or, more commonly, when one is a (possibly unacknowledged) consequence of other attitudes one has self-consciously adopted.

The mutual repulsion between the commitments implicit in attitudes of acceptance and rejection takes place at the normative level of rational entitlements to those commitments.

The origin and paradigm of the incompatibility of commitments undercutting their entitlements is the normative collision that occurs when one accepts and rejects the same claimable.

But the phenomenon is not limited to that original case where contrary attitudes are adopted towards one and the same claimable.

One treats the contents of two claimables as *incompatible* just by taking it that commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other.

I forfeit entitlement to my commitments if I both affirm and deny (accept and reject) that the plane figure is a circle.

But I incur the same normative cost if I both accept that it is a circle and accept that it is a triangle.

That is the practical normative significance of “A is circular” and “A is triangular” standing in the reason relation of material incompatibility (Aristotelian contrariety): commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other.

The fact that claimables stand to one another in the reason relation of incompatibility—the fact that commitment to one can preclude entitlement to the other—means that there is a structural asymmetry between the normative statuses of commitment and entitlement, which articulate

essential dimensions of the practice of giving and asking for reasons, making claims and defending and challenging them.

Knowing an interlocutor's attitude toward a claimable, whether they accept or reject it, is sufficient to settle their commitment with respect to it. But to assess their *entitlement* to that commitment we have to consult all their other commitments.

It is not enough that they can cite collateral commitments that provide good reasons for the commitment in question.

It is necessary also that they not in addition have undertaken commitments that provide equally good reasons against it.

Why we need *incompatibility* as a reason relation at the same level as *implication*:

In a wonderful essay called “Why ‘Not’?”, Huw Price considers the practical deficiencies of what I am calling “purely dogmatic” reason-giving practices. He imagines “ideological positivists,” who do not have a way of denying or rejecting a claim. They accordingly lack any practical acknowledgment of the *incompatibility* of two claims. (It will follow that in their logic they have no way of *negating* a claim—hence the issue of his title.) He illustrates why such practices wouldn't work with a nice dialogue:

Me: ‘Fred is in the kitchen.’ (Sets off for kitchen.)

You: ‘Wait! Fred is in the garden.’

Me: ‘I see. But he is in the kitchen, so I’ll go there.’ (Sets off.)

You: ‘You lack understanding. The kitchen is Fred-free.’

**Me: ‘Is it really? But Fred’s in it, and that’s the important thing.’
(Leaves for kitchen.)**

Unless the claims we accept can *exclude* some other acceptances, they can't guide our actions.

The essential conceptual starting-point of Shannon information theory—well upstream of the issue of how to *quantify* information—is the idea that if a message does not exclude some alternatives that were previously open, it conveys no information at all. We would learn *nothing* practically from finding out that there are reasons *for* someone to accept a claim—say, “Fred is in the garden,”—unless those same considerations can serve also as reasons *against* accepting some other claims—“Fred is in the kitchen,”—which accordingly count as *incompatible* with the original claim. That means that the very same claim that is a reason *for* one commitment must also be a reason *against* some others.

Not only must it be possible to accept or to reject any claimable, in addition, adopting either of those attitudes towards a claimable must be able to serve *both* as a reason to *accept* some further claimables (a reason *for* them), *and* as a reason to *reject* some other claimables (a reason *against* them). What can be accepted or rejected must stand both in relations of implication and in relations of incompatibility.

A discursive practice cannot be intelligible as articulated by one sort of reason relation unless it is intelligible as articulated by the other as well.

But does one forbid gluts: accepting and rejecting same claimable? Priest no. Ripley yes—in favor of gaps for paradoxical ones.

RR-BL is literally two sides, of turnstile, lining up with pragmatic binary accept/reject. Then have global (non) entitlement = incoherence = out-of-boundedness.

I'll add a further level of fine structure, in terms of commitment-entitlement plus explicit distinction of $|\sim$ and $\#$, for both single and multiple succedent sequents.

Explain relation between incompatibility and incoherence, and say when perp or empty side is used to codify those notions notationally in the consequence relation or sequents. Say why that is convenient but courts a danger of misleading. Tarski does it with explosion, which is worse (it adds problematic commitments).

One might think that RR-bilateralism is single-sorted—that is, that it is not deontically two-dimensional, but merely binary in-bounds/out-of-bounds.

Officially, that is right. But that conclusion is misleading.

RR-bilateralism asks, in effect, **whether one can be entitled to this constellation of commitments**. If so, it is “in bounds.” If not, it is “out of bounds.”

It is important to rehearse this bit of the scorekeeping mechanics in the vicinity of incompatibility (which also show why two-dimensional deontics is more expressively powerful) that define the pragmatic significance of assertions, **in order to set up the “preclusion of entitlement” deontic normative readings of $|\sim$ and $\#$** .

Those readings are a way of **implementing an incompatibility semantics**, but in a much more nuanced way than I do in *BSD*.

Incompatibility is really the key idea to my finer-grained bilateralist deontic pragmatic MV for interpreting reason relations.

a) A pragmatic opposition, introduced by bilateralists:
Accept/reject, assert/deny (corresponding attitudes and speech acts)

b) **Pragmatics-first vs. Semantics first** explanation of:
Accept/reject, assert/deny (corresponding attitudes and speech acts)
Relative to
true/false.

The world does not come with the dyad true/false in it.

All the facts are truths, because “a fact is a thought (thinkable) that is true.” (Frege)

In Fine's hyperintensional truthmaker semantics, each sentence has both truthmakers and falsemakers, but the states that play those roles are not intrinsically one or the other.

The state that is truthmaker for one claimable might be falsemaker for another, or not either for any claim.

It must be our use of them that associates expressions with states as their truth- or falsemakers. A pragmatics-first order of explanation takes this route to an account of the use of 'true' and 'false'. (Pricean subject = pragmatic account, rather than object = (representational) semantic MV.)

c) Want to be two-dimensional rather than binarist about these, too.

That is, do not define rejection as not-accepting-not, or denial as not-asserting-not.

Keep two separate sets of books.

This is the idea of Fine's truthmaker semantics (on a semantics-first order of explanation): have separate semantic interpretants for *making-true* and *making-false*.

d) Argued last time that concepts of assertion and reasons are intimately connected.

Whether we think in terms of authority/responsibility or (preferred) commitment/entitlement as our deontic statuses, to make sense of the pragmatic significance of assertions, must see them as moves in a game that includes giving *reasons*.

e) In context of the pragmatic opposition of accept/reject, can see two flavors of reasons: Reasons to *accept* vs. reasons to *reject*.

f) We can think of these as inducing two kinds of reason relations among claimables: reasons *for* and reasons *against*.

g) In a further move, we can think of those reason relations as *implication* or *consequence*, and *incompatibility*. In (single-succedent) sequent form, can write these as $\Gamma \mid \sim A$ and $\Gamma \# A$.

Putting these together is lining up:

- Reasons to accept/reject,
- Reasons for/against,
- Implication/incompatibility.

h) Q: What does *this* route from pragmatic MV account of speech acts to reason relations among claimables have to do with that *other* route, from commitment/entitlement to incompatibility relations among claimables?

Q: What connection is there between the bilateralist dyads accept/reject, assert/deny, and the two deontic dimensions?

A: I have a *detailed* answer to this question.

It goes through the understanding of *reason relations* of implication/incompatibility, which govern reasons for/against.

With that mediation, the answer to the question is the definition of $|\sim$ and $\#$ in terms of commitment and (preclusion of) entitlement.

[Use this question to structure the constructive discussion.]

i) This is the constructive culmination of this line of thought:

The official definitions of *explicit* and *implicit* commitments/entitlements in reason relations:

$\Gamma|\sim A$ says that commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to reject A.

$\Gamma\#A$ says that commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to accept A.

Then:

A crucial further step is the final move to define ***implicit commitment*** to accept A from reading $\Gamma|\sim A$ as “commitment to accept of all of Γ precludes entitlement to deny A” as involving *implicit* commitment to accept A, and reading $\Gamma\#A$ as “commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to accept A” as involving *implicit* commitment to deny A.”

So understood, $\Gamma|\sim A$ says that commitment to accept all of Γ *implicitly* commits one to accept A—since one cannot be *entitled* to reject it.

So understood, $\Gamma\#A$ says that commitment to accept all of Γ *implicitly* commits one to reject A—since one cannot be *entitled* to accept it.

These notions of *implicit* commitment express what was right in a merely *binary* way of thinking (without entitlements, or with commitment as not-entitled-not).

But they have the advantage of marking the *distinction* between the more nuanced two-dimensional conceptualization and the rougher merely binary one.

The finer-grained bilateralism that I am proposing models *implication on incompatibility*.

In this way, it takes the opposite path from the tradition, which models incompatibility on implication, treating incompatibility as a *degenerate case* of implication.

That is, the definition of *incompatibility* in our recommended deontic normative pragmatic MV is the model.

It uses ***commitments precluding entitlement*** (which is the original *MIE* version of incompatibility) to define, first (obviously) ‘incompatibility.’

And then second, it uses that *same* relation to define *implication*, by switching the *valence* of the *attitude*, from acceptance to rejection (assertion to denial).

One substantive, but deceptive (because hidden in the notation) and potentially misleading aspect of this **notational subordination of incompatibility to implication** is the duality it enforces between incompatibility (they think: inconsistency) and theoremhood.

Theoremhood is codified as an empty LHS.

Incoherence (and so [though I need to discuss this connection] incompatibility) are codified as an empty RHS.

The kind of equivalence-as-duality of theoremhood and inconsistency is not ideologically trivial. It could be thought of as an inferentialist version of the two statuses-attitudes that we take to be primitive: accept/reject.

But it is a *perverse* way of acknowledging that dimension.

For theoremhood builds in monotonicity (MO)—in that if A is a theorem, so $\vdash A$, then for an X , $X \vdash A$.

And the empty RHS, through MO on the right, means that any set Γ : $\Gamma \vdash$ is such that for any A , $\Gamma \vdash A$.

But this is explosion.

Assuming that is assuming that once a premise-set is incoherent, one cannot reason with it, in the sense that there is no longer a distinction between what follows from it and what does not.

But this is not so.

- a) It can't be, since we do have incoherent, even inconsistent beliefs. Cf. The Preface Paradox (which MacF makes good use of).] So we *must* be able to reason from incoherent premises, at least in a minimal sense.
- b) And in fact, we can and do.

My two-dimensional renderings of \vdash and $\#$ are like RR-bilateral, and unlike SR-bilateral versions, in attaching accept/reject (RR say “assert/deny”) to the turnstile sides, rather than to particular claimables. So, premise side is always commitments to accept, and conclusion side can be either status, but not mixed.

Q: Why not allow denials in premises, or mixed premise sets?

A: Get full set of reason relations this way.

For we can get logical negation from incompatibility, as $\#$, and with that can then do conditionals with mixed negated and non-negated antecedents, which express mixed acceptances and rejections. So we can show that \vdash and $\#$ are expressively complete in a sense that is both precise and natural.

So do not need to attach pragmatic valences to individual claimables, as SR-bilateralism does.

I have argued that **what can be accepted must be capable of being rejected**, and what can be rejected must be capable of being accepted,

and that **what can serve as a *reason to accept* some acceptable/rejectable must be capable of serving as a *reason to reject* other acceptables/rejectables, and *vice versa*.**

I have accepted Harman's argument that we should distinguish between norms governing conditional practical attitudes of acceptance/rejection and the reason *relations* that constrain, but do not determine those norms.

As a result, I have argued, we must understand what can be accepted or rejected as standing in *both* sorts of reason relations: *implications*, codifying reason-*for* relations, and *incompatibilities*, codifying reason-*against* relations.

All of this is a way of implementing the strategy of appealing to practical attitudes of accepting and rejecting what is expressed by sentences in order to understand the acceptable/rejectable *contents* expressed by declarative sentences by looking first to *reasons* other attitudes provide to accept or reject. The connection permitting this transition is supplied by the principle that a reason *to* accept (adopt that attitude) is governed by a relation between reasons *for* the content or object of that attitude (what is accepted), and that a reason *to* reject (adopt that attitude) is governed by a relation between reasons *against* the content or object of that attitude (what is rejected).

In this way we move from the idea of practical attitudes providing reasons *to do* something (adopt other attitudes) to relations of implication and incompatibility (reasons for and against) relating what can now be understood as what those attitudes are attitudes towards. It is an explanatory advance from *pragmatics*, studying what one is doing in adopting discursive attitudes, to *semantics*, studying the contents of those attitudes. Those contents are now thought of as nodes in a network of relations of implication and incompatibility.

Part 2: Turnabout: Moving from reason relations to constraints on reasoning practices.
MacFarlane's criteria of adequacy.

Part 1 offers an account of reason relations of implication and incompatibility, \sim and #, in terms of a bilateral deontic pragmatics that is deepened by a) making explicit the implicit two-dimensionality of RR-bilateralism and b) using a subtler version of incompatibility (not just for #, but for \sim , too—that is one of the benefits of going bilateral) in the form of “preclusion of entitlement.”

Part 2 then explores the sense in which those reason relations can be understood to *normatively govern* practices of reasoning.

Together, this will amount to a substantial, detailed filling-in of Harman's insight into the necessity of *distinguishing* practices of reasoning from reason *relations*.

Can think of MacF as setting criteria of adequacy for an account of reason relations, and Restall as giving us the raw materials. The account I'm offering is working off of Restall to respond to MacF—as well as a bunch of other criteria of adequacy that arise from the overall order of explanation I am pursuing.

Aside on Berkeley connection:

Last time recommended Hannah Ginsborg's paper on normativity of meaning.

This week: John MacFarlane's paper on the normativity of logic.

(He is a proud Pitt Ph.D., who did his diss with me.)

They are both longtime stalwarts, and former chairs, at Berkeley.

Re MacFarlane:

“But it turns out to be surprisingly hard to say how facts about the validity of inferences relate to norms for reasoning,” [Abstract].

Nothing turns on its being *logical* validity of inferences.

I've suggested we talk about relations of implication and goodness of inferences, as a way of terminologically respecting Harman's point.

Make the distinction between *logical* implication/incompatibility and *material*, i.e. *non-* or *prelogical* reason relations.

All the talk of reason for and against, and, so, relations of implication or consequence and incompatibility or incoherence had not had to *mention* (though perhaps, they used) specifically *logical* notions of consequence and incompatibility.

MacF's real topic is what the *goodness of implications* has to do with *norms of reasoning*.

For an inferentialist, this is a way of asking about relations between *semantic* MV (“goodness of implications”) and *pragmatic* MV.

But we don't need to take on that extra commitment. We can just talk about MVs of *reason relations*—I'll call those “rational MVs” in relation to normative pragmatic MVs.

The home language-game of norms is *doings*, practices, uses, hence *pragmatics*.

He is asking about how we understand the relations between reason *relations* and norms of reasoning.

Good question.

Our deepened, explicitly deontically two-dimensional bilateralist account of what reason relations *mean* offers one response to this question.

That answer moves from claims made in a normative pragmatic MV to claims made in a rational MV.

In the Mandala of Metavocabularies of Reason, this is the arrow from the Pragmatics vertex to the internal Reason Relations triangle.

Now we are asking about the relations between these coming from the other direction.

Suppose we knew the reason relations, what would that tell us about the norms governing inferential practices of reasoning?

We can use this as a test.

If our answer to the question of how facts stated in these two kinds of MV are related is a good one, it should let us answer MacF's question.

Showing that it does is the gravamen of Part 2.

MacFarlane:

We need a bridge principle of the following form:

BRIDGE PRINCIPLE: If $A, B \models C$, then (normative claim about believing A, B, and C).

The question is what the consequent should look like. We can generate a nice set of options

by varying three parameters:

1. *Type of deontic operator*. Do facts about logical validity give rise to strict *obligations*, *permissions*, or (defeasible) *reasons* for belief?

2. *Polarity*. Are these obligations/permissions/reasons *to believe*, or merely *not to disbelieve*?

3. *Scope of deontic operator*. These norms are in some sense conditional: what one ought/may/has reason to believe with respect to C depends somehow on what one believes, or ought/may/has reason to believe, with respect to A and B. Does the deontic operator govern the *consequent* of the conditional

$(P \rightarrow O : Q)$, or both the antecedent and the consequent $(O : P \rightarrow O : Q)$, or the whole conditional $(O : (P \rightarrow Q))$?

Table 1: If $A, B \models C$, then . . .

- c Deontic operator embedded in consequent.
- o Deontic operator is strict obligation (ought).
- c_o+ if you believe A and you believe B, you ought to believe C.
- c_o- if you believe A and you believe B, you ought not disbelieve C.
- p Deontic operator is permission (may).

Cp+ if you believe A and you believe B, you may believe C.
 Cp- if you believe A and you believe B, you are permitted not to disbelieve C.
 r Deontic operator is “has (defeasible) reason for.”
 Cr+ if you believe A and you believe B, you have reason to believe C.
 Cr- if you believe A and you believe B, you have reason not to disbelieve C.
 B Deontic operator embedded in both antecedent and consequent.
 o Deontic operator is strict obligation (ought).
 Bo+ if you ought to believe A and believe B, you ought to believe C.
 Bo- if you ought to believe A and believe B, you ought not disbelieve C.
 p Deontic operator is permission (may).
 Bp+ if you may believe A and believe B, you may believe C.
 Bp- if you may believe A and believe B, you are permitted not to disbelieve C.
 r Deontic operator is “has (defeasible) reason for.”
 Br+ if you have reason to believe A and believe B, you have reason to believe C.
 Br- if you have reason to believe A and believe B, you have reason not to disbelieve C.
 W Deontic operator scopes over whole whole conditional.
 o Deontic operator is strict obligation (ought).
 Wo+ you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
 Wo- you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
 p Deontic operator is permission (may).
 Wp+ you may see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
 Wp- you may see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
 r Deontic operator is “has (defeasible) reason for.”
 Wr+ you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
 Wr- you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
 -k (As suffix to one of the above:) antecedent of bridge principle is “If *you know that* A,B |= C”
 Adding the “knowledge” condition *k* turns these 18 alternatives into 36.

He ends up only considering cases with **Wide** scope over the conditional.

Notice that this is *just* what RR-bilateralism does.

It assesses whether the *whole position*, including the commitments (to accept) in the premises and the commitments (to reject) in the conclusion, is in-bounds or out-of-bounds.

That is wide scope.

Further:

“Disbelieving” is a mental state that stands in the same relation to believing as denying does to asserting. [8]

That is, “disbelieving” is *rejecting*.

His considerations for assessing the different bridge principles are these:

1. EXCESSIVE DEMANDS. W_o+ implies that you ought either to cease believing the axioms of Peano Arithmetic or come to believe all the theorems as well.
2. THE PARADOX OF THE PREFACE.
3. THE STRICTNESS TEST. Broome 2000 argues that “The relation between believing *p* and believing *q* [a logical consequence of *p*] is strict. If you believe *p* but not *q*, you are definitely not entirely as you ought to be” (85). The W_r ’s do not capture this strictness.

They allow that one might believe p but not its logical consequence q and still be just as one ought to be.

[Skip (4), which is about knowledge.]

5. LOGICAL OBTUSENESS. Suppose someone believes A and believes B but just refuses to take a stand on their conjunction, $A \wedge B$. Intuitively, there is something wrong with her: she is being illogical.

MacF's conclusion:

My own temptation is to go for a combination of W_{O-} and W_{R+} .

W_{O-} you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B , you do not disbelieve C .

W_{R+} you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B , you believe C .

My conclusion:

W_{O-} is RR-bilateralism. That is what we have taken as our starting point.

W_{R+} is what our notion of (pragmatically) *implicit* commitment captures.

$\Gamma \mid \sim A$ iff commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to deny A .

That is our analogue of W_{O-} .

If commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to deny A , then it *implicitly commits* one to *accept* A .

So basically, our finer-grained, deontically two-dimensional pragmatic understanding of implication underwrites W_{O-} for *explicit* attitudes, and W_{R+} for *implicit* attitudes.

It introduces a distinct notion of *implicit* acceptance/rejection precisely to distinguish W_{O-} from W_{R+} , showing how they should be understood not as rivals, but as complementing one another, if they are put in the form:

(Explicit): W_{O-} .

(Implicit): W_{R+} .

So the line I have taken is a more nuanced version of MacFarlane's view.

Punchline:

Both RR-bilateralism and my more nuanced version of it satisfy MacF's criteria of adequacy.

(After MacF:) The story in Part II should include further discussion of

- a) the sense in which $\mid \sim$ codifies (expresses) the relation of being a reason *for* and $\#$ codifies the relation of being a reason *against*.
- b) The relation between *giving* a reason *for*, in the speech act of *defending* a claim (assertion) against a challenge and *giving* a reason *against*, in the speech act of *challenging* a claim (assertion).

For *these* points go beyond the constraints on solutions we can get from MacF.

The treatment of MacFarlane shows that in Part I, I should emphasize the introduction of the notion of *implicit* commitment to accept/reject as a nontrivial, indeed, important move. This is the idea of ***pragmatically implicit commitments***.

When I discuss *the pathology of taking explication to be inconsequential* [next week, in Reason Relations I], I will be talking about a ***semantic notion of implicit commitments***.

Some leftover stuff:

To say that a set Γ of acceptables/rejectables *implies* acceptable/rejectable A , we can write “ $\Gamma \vdash A$.” Use of the “snake turnstile” rather than the more familiar double turnstile \models of semantic consequence or the single turnstile \vdash of derivability reminds us that we are expressing *material* implications, not *logical* implications.

(An implication is logically good in case it meets two conditions: i) it is materially good, and ii) it’s material goodness is robust under arbitrary uniform substitution of nonlogical vocabulary for nonlogical vocabulary.)

To say that a set Γ of acceptables/rejectables is *incompatible* with acceptable/rejectable A , we can write “ $\Gamma \# A$.” (For my purposes here it suffices to stick to the more familiar and intuitive single-succedent notation. I’ll have something to say later about the multisuccedent analogues.)

One mark of that invisibility of incompatibility (compared to implication), or better, technique for achieving it, is notational. In Gentzen-style sequent calculus formulations of reason relations, there is no separate sign for the relation of incompatibility. Incompatibilities are notationally assimilated to implications. To say that Γ is incompatible with A (what I am expressing by “ $\Gamma \# A$ ”), in a system of single-succedent sequents we write something like “ $\Gamma, A \perp$.” This attributes a property, call it “incoherence” to everything on the left of the turnstile, and says which property it is by using the perp sign for absurdity. Incoherence is expressed as implication of the absurd. This notation obviously builds in the symmetry of incompatibility, since “ $\Gamma, A, B \perp$ ” says *both* that, in the context of Γ , B is incompatible with A *and* that, in the context of Γ , A is incompatible with B (and similarly for any element of Γ). In multisuccedent sequent calculi the same effect is achieved—even less transparently—by foregoing the special sign for absurdity and having an empty right-hand side.

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